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1 Asteroids
Sixty ￿ve million years ago an asteroid crashed into earth Global winds dis-
tributed the dust throughout the atmosphere, blocking sunlight, and many life-
forms that relied on the sun eventually perished. In a short period of time, many
experts believe, the mighty dinosaurs that dominated our planet went extinct.
Realistically the same fate awaits us. Over 99:99% of the species that have ever
existed are now extinct [13] [12]. If our species survives long enough, we will be
exposed to an asteroid and could su⁄er the same fate as the dinosaurs. The data
suggests that asteroids of that caliber will hit our planet on average once every
100 million years [12]. The last one was 65 million years ago. Under current
conditions, when the next one hits the earth, humans and many other species
could go extinct.
What should we do about this threat to our survival and others like it? And
if the issue is serious, why is this issue getting so little attention whereas the
less catastrophic threat of global warming is in the news almost daily?
The purpose of this article is to provide answers to these questions. We
examine systematically how to deal with catastrophic risks such as asteroid
impacts, which are small probability events with enormous consequences, events
that could threaten the survival of our species, and compare their treatment with
risks like global warming that are more imminent and familiar but possibly less
catastrophic.
The task is not easy. Classic tools for risk management are notoriously
poor for managing catastrophic risks.1 There have typically an understandable
tendency to ignore rare events, such as an asteroid impact, which are unlikely to
￿This article reports research performed at the Columbia Consortium for Risk Management
(CCRM), Columbia University, New York, see Columbia￿ s Program on Information and Re-
sources (PIR), www.p-i-r.com. Some of the references are available at www.chichilnisky.com.
1See Posner, [12] and Chichilnisky [4] [5].
1occur in our lifetimes or those of our families [10] [12]. Yes this is a questionable
instinct at this stage of human evolution where our knowledge enables to identify
such risks. Standard decision tools make this task di¢ cult. We show using the
existing data that a major disturbance caused by global warming of less than
1% of GDP overwhelms in expected value the costs associated with an asteroid
impact that can plausibly lead to the extinction of the human species. We show
that the expected value of the loss caused by an asteroid that leads to extinction
- is between $500 million and $92 billion. A loss of this magnitude is smaller that
of a failure of a single atomic plant - the Russians lost more than $140 billion
with the accident at Chernobyl - or with the potential risks involved in global
warming that is between $890 billion and $9:7 trillion [12]. Using expected values
therefore we are led to believe that preventing asteroid impacts should not rank
high in our policy priorities. Common sense rebels against the computation we
just provided. The ability to anticipate and plan for threats that have never
been experienced by any current or past member of the species and are unlikely
to happen in our lifespans, appears to be unique to our species. We need to use
a risk management approach that enables us to deal more e⁄ectively with such
threats [12]. To overcome this problem this article summarizes an axiomatic
approach to catastrophic risks that updates current methods [3] [4] [5], and
o⁄ers practical computations to evaluate possible policies that would protect
us from asteroid impacts . Our conclusion is that we are under-investing in
preventing the risk of asteroid like threats. Much can and should be done; the
article suggests a methodology and a range of dollar values that should be spent
to protect against such risks and help prevent the extinction of our species.
2 Catastrophes and the survival of the species
A catastrophe is a rare event with enormous consequences. In a recent book
Richard Posner [12] classi￿es catastrophes into various types, each of which
threats the survival of our species. He uses a classic approach to value the
importance of a risk by quantifying its expected value, namely the product of
the probability times the loss. For example, the expected value of an event
that occurs with ten percent probability and involves $1 billion loss is $109 ￿
10￿1 = $100 million: This approach is used by actuaries to price the cost of life
insurance policies, and is also the measure used in Congress when evaluating
budget plans with uncertain outcomes. The notion of expected value started
with Von Neumann and Morgenstern about 60 years ago [18], and it is based
on their axiomatic treatment of decision making under uncertainty formalized
in [2] and [7]. Posner [12] uses the concept of expected value to evaluate risks
but he warns the reader about its weaknesses for evaluating catastrophic risks.2
This weakness is exposed in the case of asteroids, for example, when we ask
how much we should invest in preventing the impact of an asteroid that can
destroy all of earth￿ s economic value forever. Posner [12] argues that expected
value does not capture the true impact of a catastrophe, that something else is
2See Posner [12], Chapter 3, p.150-154.
2at stake. Because of his loyalty to the concept of expected value, which does
not work well in these cases, Posner appears to be arguing that rationality does
not work in the case of catastrophes, that we cannot deal rationally with small
probabilities events that cause such large and irreversible damage.
Perhaps the problem is not one of rationality. There may be a di⁄erent
rationality needed when considering the long range future of the species. It
could be that expected value is a good measure for evaluating risks that have
a good chance to occur in our lifetime, but not for evaluating risks that are
important but have essentially a zero chance to occur while we are alive. For
such risks we may need another approach overall, for both the present and
the future. In our current state of evolution it would seem useful to oppose
a human tendency based on our hunter gatherer origins to give preference to
immediate outcomes as opposed to more distant ones, see Cohen [10]. When
using expected value the response we obtain seems to clash with our intuition
because the probabilities involved are so small that they render the computation
almost meaningless, as seen numerically in the examples provided below. The
experimental evidence summarized below provides further support for this view.
3 Experimental evidence and alternative approaches
Expected utility optimization derives from Von Neumann￿ s (NM) axioms, but it
is well known for some time that it con￿ icts with the experimental evidence on
how humans choose under uncertainty, e.g. Allais [1] Machina, [8] [9], Tversky
and Wakker [14]. Problems arise when there are infrequent events involved;
examples are weather catastrophes like hurricanes or mass extinctions. Simi-
lar types of con￿ icts appear when using the standard criterion of present value
optimization for choosing among projects that evolve through time. Other prob-
lems arise when the plans involve very long time horizons as in the disposal of
nuclear waste (Heal, [6]). While the problem areas mentioned above are quite
di⁄erent, they all share a common mathematical root: the relative insensitivity
of the classic axioms of choice towards (1) small probability events, (2) the far
away future [3] [4] [5] [6]. The mathematical structure of the problem is the
same in all cases: it arises from the use of ￿ normal￿distributions, the ￿ bell
curves￿to describe the frequency with which we expect everything to occur
from weather events to returns on investments or corporate pro￿ts. Normal
distributions arise when many independent events contribute to some outcome.
However when there are unexpected interconnections or catastrophic events,
normal distribution can understate (1) the role of small probability events, (2)
the role of events that are very far into the future. We formalize this problem
below and provide a solution.
Taking a leaf from Von Neumann and Morgenstern￿ s book, Chichilnisky [3]
[4] [5] re-considered the foundations of the expected value approach, which are
the VNM axioms for choice under uncertainty, see also Arrow [2] and Hernstein
& Milnor [7]. A ￿rst step is to show that classic axioms can be ￿ biased￿against
small probability events, as was established in Chichilnisky [3]. She introduced
3new axioms for choice under uncetainty that require more symmetry in the
treatment of small and large probability events [4][5]. The new axioms coincide
with those of Von Neumann￿ s and Morgenstern￿ s when the events involved have
￿ normal￿probabilities, for example when they are likely to occur in our lifetime.
But the new axioms give rise to a rather di⁄erent decision making criterion
when the probabilities involved are extremely small, or equivalently when the
events are only likely to occur in a very long future. The two sets of axioms are
consistent with each other for ￿ normal￿events while they are quite di⁄erent on
catastrophic events. How can this be?
A somewhat far-fetched analogy is the relationship between classical me-
chanics and general relativity. The former applies to ￿ normal scales￿that are
closer to own reality on earth, while the latter applies to large scale phenom-
ena involving astral bodies. Both are correct in their respective spheres, and
neither contradicts the other. The same could be the case with the Von Neu-
mann Morgenstern and the Chichilnisky￿ s axioms. The next section presents
the new axioms. It has been shown empirically and theoretically (Posner [12]
and Chichilnisky [4]) that standard tools of decision making under uncertainty
are ill suited to evaluate such risks, more on this below.
In sum: the standard approaches do not provide a satisfactory answer and
we provide here an alternative approach to risk management that seems better
suited to the management of catastrophic risks and risks that are most likely
to occur in the very distant future. This approach has an axiomatic treatement
that paralells Von Neumann￿ s theory of choice under uncertainty, but extends
it require equal treatement for frequent and rare events.
The next sections provide empirical motivation for the new approach by
comparing it with expected utility in two risk pro￿les: asteroids and global
warming risks.
4 Two risk pro￿les: Asteroids and Global Warm-
ing
In September 16 2000 the British Task Force on Potentially Hazardous Near
Earth Objects (NEO) produced a report classifying asteroids risks by their size,
energy yield, and average interval between impacts Large mass extinctions - for
example the Cretaceous Terciary Geological boundary - follow from the impact
of asteroids of 16 km in diameter, which occur on the average once every 100
million years, and threaten the survival of all advanced life forms on the planet
of which 99.9% have already gone extinct [11]. Below we compare the risk pro￿le
presented by asteroids with global warming risks.
￿ An asteroid impact of this magnitude occurs on average once every 100
million years
￿ It produces damage of about $120 trillion [12], obliterating all human
produced value in the planet
4￿ The damage is permanent - it continues annually for about 1 billion year,
the expected lifetime of our planet before it is destroyed by our sun be-
coming a red star
￿ Existing observations indicate that such an event will not take place in
the next 30 years
Below we compare this risk with the risk of ￿ global warming￿with the fol-
lowing simpli￿ed pro￿le:
￿ The probability of global warming is 1, namely it is happening
￿ The best estimate is that it will produce damage that is calculated for
the catastrophic case to bring in a permanent loss of about $2 trillion
a year loss in the US and globally about $8 trillion a year loss see for
example (Posner, [12]). There is no consensus on whether the gradual or
the catastrophic case for global warming is more likely.
Before examining the two risk pro￿les we explain the connection between
rare events and events in the distant future.
5 Decisions over time and under uncertainty
We adopt a simple approach that views ￿ choices over time￿and ￿ choices under
uncertainty￿as two aspects of one and the same phenomenon.
The probability of an event is viewed as the frequency with which this event
is likely to occur through time.3 For example, drawing ￿ heads￿ with a fair
coin is an event with probability 0:50 because in repeated ￿ ipping of the coin,
￿ tails￿tend to occur 50% of the time. The appearance of ￿heads￿ is thus a
relatively frequent event, one that will on average occur one out of every two
trials. If we ￿ ip a coin every year, for example, heads will occur almost surely
in our lifetime. In this context, high frequency over time translates into high
probability and viceversa. Low frequency events translate into low probability
and viceversa. This way we treat ￿ time￿and ￿ uncertainty.￿as two aspects of the
same phenomenon.
We saw that high probability events are those that occur frequently in time.
In the case of asteroids, we know with certainty that at some point in time one
will hit the earth and destroy most life on the planet unless we take action. The
probability of such destructive event sometime in the future is one, although
the event is so infrequent that the probability is essentially zero in any person￿ s
life time.
A catastrophe has been de￿ned in [12] [3] as an event with enormous negative
consequences - such as the extinction of the species ￿ an event that occurs with
3A word of warning is in order. This is not the only approach to de￿ning probabilities ￿
indeed many people object to it because of it views reality as an experiment that can repeat
itself. Yet for our purposes here the approach has an important advantage in that it simpli￿es
matters and at the same time generalizes the results.
5probability one some time in the distant future, but has nearly zero probabilty
of occurring during the life time of any one individual. There is basically zero
risk that the ￿ catastrophe￿will occur in our lifetime, although we know for sure
it will occur at some point in the future. It is possible although very unlikely
that we will pick up the papers tomorrow and read that some astronomer has
discovered a massive comet taking deadly aim at our planet. With this de￿ni-
tion, it becomes clear that dealing with catastrophes is the same as dealing with
events that take place in the distant future. It is well known that the losses from
events that take place in the very long run future are ￿ discounted￿in an expo-
nential manner to obtain a ￿ present value￿, and that this exponential discount
renders long term losses almost meaningless. Having connected ￿ choices over
time￿and ￿ choices under uncertainty￿ , this explains why expected value, which
is the parallel to ￿ present discounted value￿ , leads to counterintuitive evaluation
of catastrophic losses. or for that matter distort outcomes generally. We need
to de￿ne the framework and apply it to evalaute risk.
6 The Mathematics of Risk
A system is in one of several possible states which can be described by real
numbers. To each state s 2 R there is an associated outcome, so that one has
f(s) 2 RN; N ￿ 1. A description of outcomes across all states is called a lottery
f : R ! RN: The space of all lotteries is therefore a function space L.4 Under
conditions of uncertainty one makes decisions by ranking lotteries in L.
Von Neumann-Morgenstern (NM) axioms provided a mathematical formal-
ization of how to rank or order lotteries. Optimization according to such an
order is called expected utility (EU) and de￿nes standard decision making under
uncertainty. The main result from the NM axioms is that the decision procedure





where the real line R is the state space, x : R ! RN is a ￿lottery￿ , u : RN ! R
is a utility function describing the utility provided by the outcome of the lottery
in each state s; u(s), and where d￿(x) is a countably additive measure over
states in R that determines their relative frequency. Arrow [2] explains why
utility functions must be essentially bounded so as to overcome the St Petesburg
paradox. This implies that the space L of utility values provided by lotteries L =
L1; namely it is the space of measurable and (essentially) bounded functions5
on the line R: Using the EU criterion, a lottery x is ranked above another y if
and only if W assigns to x a larger real number:
x ￿ y , W(x) > W(y);
4Identi￿ed in the following by the space of all essentially bounded real valued furnctions
with the ￿ sup norm￿ , denoted L1:
5An essentially bounded function is a measurable function that is bounded except perhaps
on a set of measure zero.
6where W satis￿es (1). The optimization of expected utility (EU) is a widely
used procedure for evaluating choices under uncertainty.6
In the following exmples we consider the space of lotteries to be the space
of all continuous linear real valued functions, L1 with the sup norm, and its
dual of L1; denoted L￿
1, consisting of all continuous real valued functions on
L1: L￿
1 includes integrable functions on R as well as purely ￿nite additive
measures [15] [16] that are not representable by functions, for one that assigns
the measure zero to all bounded measurable subsets of the line. Other examples
are provided below.7
6.1 Catastrophic Risks
A catastrophic risk is a rare event leading to major widespread losses. Expected
utility undervalues such risks: Chichilnisky [3] ?? [5] showed formally that us-
ing expected utility criteria underestimates catastrophic risks, and by doing so
con￿ icts with the observed evidence of how humans evaluate such risks if they
are likely to occur in their lifetimes. In order to formalize the problem we need
some de￿nitions.
De￿nition 1 A ranking W : L1 ! R is said to be insensitive to rare events
when W(x) > W(y) , W(x0) > W(y0) for any two lotteries x0 and y0 that are
obtained by modifying arbitrarily x and y on any set of states S ￿ R with an
arbitrarily small probability " = "(x;y): Formally ,
W is insensitive to rare events if :8x;y 9" = "(x;y) : W(x) > W(y) ,
W(x0) > W(y0) for all x0;y0 s.t.
y0 = y a:e:on Sc ￿ R and x = x0a:e:on Sc ￿ R;where ￿(S) < "
Otherwise, W is said to be sensitive to rare events.
De￿nition 2 W is insensitive to frequent events if:
8x;y 9" = "(x;y) : W(x) > W(y) , W(x0) > W(y0) for all x0;y0 s.t.
x0 = x and y0 = y a:e:on Sc ￿ R : ￿(S) > 1 ￿ ":
Otherwise W is called sensitive to frequent events.
Mathematically, the problem with expected utility is that it is insensitive to
rare events no matter how catastrophic these may be:
Proposition 3 Any expected utility function
R
s2R u(c(s))￿(s)ds where ￿(s) 2
L1(R)8 is insensitive to rare events.
For a proof see Chichilnisky, [3].￿
6The Euler - Lagrange equations are typically used to characterize optimal solutions.
7An example of a purely ￿nitely additive measure is the continuous linear real valued
function ￿ : L1 ! R de￿ned by ￿(f) = lims!1 f(s) on all functions that have such a limit,
and extended by using Hahn Banach theorem to the rest.
8Where
R
s2R ￿(s)ds < 1 namely ￿ 2 L1
76.2 New axioms of choice under uncertainty
Introduced in [3] [4] the following axioms contrast with Von-Neumann Morgen-
stern￿ s axioms (NM) in that they treat symmetrically rare and frequent risks.
They postulate that the ranking of lotteies W : L1 ! R satis￿es:
Axiom 1: Sensitivity to rare events.
Axiom 2: Sensitivity to frequent events.
Axiom 3: Linearity and continuity of the ranking W
Axioms 2 and 3 are standard; they satis￿ed for example by expected utility
EU. However Axiom 1 is not satis￿ed by EU (Proposition 3 above).
To clarify the meaning of these axioms, the following are examples of rank-
ings W that do not satisfy our axioms:
Example 4 Consider a criterion of choice W : L ! R that ranks lotteries
assigning measure zero to any bounded set in R [15] [16]. Such functionals are
ruled out by Axiom 2 which requires sensitivity to frequent events.
Example 5 Expected utility maximization is ruled out, as is shown in Propo-
sition 3 above (see also [3]), because it does not satisfy Axioms 1.
Like the NM axioms, the new Axioms 1, 2 and 3 lead to a representation
theorem:.
Theorem 6 There exist ranking criteria ￿ : L1 ! R that satisfy all three
axioms. Any criterion that satis￿es the axioms is a convex combination of an





u(c(s))￿(s) + ￿(￿(c(s)) (2)
where c(s) describes the value of the lottery in state s 2 R; ￿(s) is an
integrable real valued function on the line R; e.g. ￿(s) = e￿￿s, and u : R ! R
is a bounded utility function. The ￿rst term is thus an expected utility with an
L1(R) density function ￿(s), and the second term is a purely ￿nitely additive
measure such as ￿(s) = limc!1 c(s) for lotteries that have such a limit and
extended otherwise to all lotteries by Hahn Banach￿ s theorem. For a proof see
Chichilnisky [3].9.
A recent result established that the new criterion is a way to formalize the
notion of optimizing expected utility with a bound on the worst outcome in the
case of a catastrophe:
Theorem 7 Optimizing the ranking criterion in (2) is equivalent to optimizing
an expected utility function
R
R u(c(s))￿(s) subject to a constraint on the possible
loss in case of a catastrophe.
9The optimization of functionals such as ￿ is not amenable to standard tools of calculus of
variations, which must be developed in new directions. see e.g. Chichilnisky [3] [4] and Heal
[6].
8For a proof see [5].




is an integral operator with a countably additive kernel f￿
￿sgs2Z which empha-
sizes the weight of frequent events in the ranking of a lottery x 2 l1. The second
purely ￿nitely additive part ￿u(x(s) assigns positive weight to rare events, which
have small probability according to ￿: Both parts are present, so ￿ is sensitive
to small and to large probability events. Catastrophic risks are therefore ranked
more realistically by such functionals.10
Next section applies this framework for evaluating risks to the two risk pro-
￿les described above, asteroids and global warming.
7 Evaluating asteroid impacts
We ￿rst use standard methods for calculating the value of the damage caused
by a risk is discounting to its present value, which brings future value into
the present.11 The reader should refer to the risk pro￿le of an asteroid impact
presented above.
￿ In the case of an asteroid as described above, the expected cost of the loss
in any give year is obtained by multiplying $120 trillion or $120￿1012 - by
the probability of the loss, which occurs on average once every 100 million
years, and is therefore 10￿8. Once the loss occurs, however, it is assumed
to be permanent. Therefore the expected value of the loss in year N; is
1 X
t=1
(120 ￿ 1012 ￿ 10￿8) ￿ ￿











where ￿ is the time ￿ discount factor￿ , 0 < ￿ < 1: and 1￿￿ is the ￿ discount rate￿
If the risk does not occur on year N, then it can occur on year N + 1;
and if not in year N + 2, N + 3; etc., and each time it occurs, it lasts
permanently. Therefore the total risk is the sum of the risk of it occurring
on year 30, plus the risk of it occurring on year 31; plus the risk of it
occurring on year 32, etc, namely













10The optimization of functionals such as ￿ is not amenable to standard tools of calculus
of variations, which must be developed in new directions. see e.g. Chichilnisky and Heal
(1996, 2002). They give rise to nonautonomous dynamical systems, which are asymptotically
autonomous see e.g. Hirsch and Benaim (in Heal 2002).
11Posner [12] for both, and in particular p. 150 for the latter.
9At a 5% discount rate ￿ = 0:95; then the total expected discounted value of the
loss from such as asteroid is









)2 = 9:2982 ￿ 107 or about $92 million.
At a 10% discount rate that value is




￿ 81 = 4:1204 ￿ 106 or about $4 million.
At a 3% discount rate, the value is




￿ 322 =: 4:9276 ￿ 108 or about $500 million
These values pale by comparison with the estimated value of other losses
such as global warming, which are estimated to be in the tens of trillions, as
shown below. In all cases, therefore, it appears to makes sense to allocate
more funding to the global warming problem than to the problem of preventing
asteroid impacts; more on this below.
7.1 Evaluating global warming
The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found
in 1996 that human - induced global warming is already occurring. There are two
main scenarios for the damages that global warming will cause: (1) catastrophic
global warming e⁄ects, and (2) a more gradual. build up of damages
￿ Scenario 1: Catastrophic global warming. The catastrophic scenario
is described in Posner [12], P. 181, as follows. There is rapid increase in
temperature, which produces a damage that is calculated to bring in a
permanent loss of about $2 trillion a year in the US and globally about
$8 trillion a year. Considering the risk pro￿le already established above12
the present discounted value of such a disaster at a 3% discount rate is
2 ￿ 1012 ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
= 2 ￿ 1012 ￿
97
3
= 6:4667 ￿ 1013 or about $65 trillion
At a 5%discount rate the number is
2 ￿ 1012 ￿
95
5
=: 3:8 ￿ 1013 or about $38 trillion
and at a 10% discount rate the number is
2 ￿ 1012 ￿ 9 =: 1:8 ￿ 1013 or about $18 trillion
12Cf. also Posner[Posner, 1992], P. 181.
10Scenario 2: Gradual build up of damages. In the second scenario global
warming is also here today, but temperature increases slowly and its damages
increase for about 100 years to reach 1% of the planet￿ s GDP. Global GDP is
calculated to be about $120 trillion then (the same number used in the asteroid
risk). After we reach maximum damage, we consider various possibilities going
forward: (1) the annual damage remains the same a perpetuity, and (2) damages
decrease slowly and disappear 100 years.later. Lets compute using standard
technique the present discounted value of the losses.









= 1:0778 ￿ 1013, which is about $10 trillion









= 3:8 ￿ 1012 which is about $3.8 trillion









=: 9:0 ￿ 1011 which is about $900 billion
In the second case, when the damage gradually decreases until it vanishes
after 100 years following its maximum impact we have



















] = 9:7456￿1012 ￿ $9.7 trillion



















] = 3:7506￿1012 ￿ $3.7 trillion



















] = 8:9993￿1011 ￿ $890 billion.
As was indicated above, in all cases, and with all three discount rates, 3%,5%
and 10%, the global warming problem overwhelms in terms of present discounted
values the costs involved with asteroid impacts. This is despite the fact that
even in the non catastrophic case global warming decreased GDP by a small
fraction, only 1% and only after 100 years.
118 Comparing Global warming & Asteroid Im-
pacts
Using expected values we are led to believe that preventing asteroid impacts
should not rank high in our policy priorities. The results from the numeri-
cal computations provided above to evaluate the risks of asteroids and global
warming seem counterintuituve. How can it be that a major disturbance caused
by global warming - even when we take very conservative estimated losses of
less than 1% of GDP building up slowly over 100 years - overwhelm the costs
associated with an asteroid impact that can plausibly lead to the extinction of
the human species? The expected value of the loss caused by an asteroid that
leads to extinction - is between $500 million and $92 billion, as seen above. A
loss of this magnitude is smaller that of a failure of a single atomic plant - the
Russians lost more than $140 billion with the accident at Chernobyl - or with
the potential risks involved in global warming that is between $890 billion and
$9:7 trillion. Common sense rebels against the computation we just provided.
Lets use other examples for comparison. In the year 2004, the pro￿ts of the 10
biggest oil companies were about $100 billion. It seems therefore unreasonable
to think of losses from asteroid impacts as valued between$500 million and $92
billion. At this rate, it seems di¢ cult to believe that we will ever do anything
about averting human extinction, since current priorities will always outweighed
such infrequent events, no matter how important they may be. Is there anything
wrong with this argument? The alternative is to use the evaluation criterion
arising from Axioms 1, 2 and 3 above. In view of the representation Theorem,
the next section utilizes a ranking function ￿ as de￿ned in 2, and to make
the computation explicit, provides a plausible number for the parameter ￿ that
appears in the de￿nition of ￿ above:
9 Catastrophes and the Survival of the Species
The axioms proposed here lead us to evaluate catastrophic risks by a formula
that adds to the present expected value a second term that focuses on rare
events. To focus on catastrophes that involve extinction of the human species.
We evaluate the cost of an event using a sum of the presented expected value
plus the cost of extinction of the species. The most conservative scenario for the
cost of extinction of the species (Posner [12]) is when everyone alive today dies
without warning, and at probabilities that are so small that the value of a human
life is computed (according to experimental evidence) at about $50;000: Recall
(Posner [12]) that the value of life decreases with the probability of death, so
this number corresponds to events with probabilities lower that 1 in 100 million.
At such small probabilities, with the current population, the species extinction
event amounts to $600 trillion. We may therefore assume that, in the following






the expression ￿u(x(s) = $600 trillion.
To use this approach, we need to specify now a value for ￿; which is the
￿ weight￿one gives to extremely small probability events in one￿ s decision making.
It is clear that the weight to give to the second term - which addresses the value
of the low probability and thus likely distant event - is somewhat subjective.
Those concerned about the long term fate of our species may argue that we
should consider it equally to the more familiar current - and likely more frequent-
threat like global warming. Others may argue that our capability to deal with
such a threat will improve with time and therefore we should not spend too
much on a threat that will most likely only occur in the distant future. For
this discussion we will just note that many people represented by those would
say that it is a mistake to spend money on something that will occur millions
of years from now devalue the threat for an incorrect reason. They incorrectly
conclude that something that occurs only every 100 million years on average
will not occur in their lifetime. But it can, in fact the likelihood is the same
every year.
Example 8 Valuating the parameter ￿: an illustration.
Cosnider the criterion ￿ de￿nde in 2 above. We assume that we give the
catastrophic event a weight of only 1 in 100,000, namely
1 ￿ ￿ = 10￿5: or equivalently ￿ = 1 ￿ 10￿5.
On this basis we can compare the global warming scenario with the asteroid
collision scenario. One takes into consideration
(1) Neither of the two cases of global warming - abrupt or gradual - involve
human extinction, while
(2) The asteroid impact considered here does involve extinction of the human
species.
Under those conditions, the total cost involved in global warming are (ap-
proximately) $66 trillion at 3% discount rates, as shown above, while the total
cost involved in an asteroid impact (neglecting the presented discounted value
which is no larger than $500 million as shown above), are about
$600 ￿ 1012 ￿ 10￿5 = 6 ￿ 109 = 6 billion
Under the conditions, therefore, the yearly investment in prevention of aster-
oid impacts should be about 1=10 of the yearly investment in prevention of
global warming, which is currently $1:7 billion (p. 182, Posner ([12]) leading to
$170 million, while the current expenditures are instead $3:9 million, requiring
therefore to be increased by a factor of about 60.
13Our rational decision maker who values the future of the species and under-
stands what probabilities really mean, could go through the following simple
analysis. For any value of ￿ even close to one half the expected value we have
calculated and makes asteroids more threatening than global warming that is
attracting all the attention of policy makers and the public today. In one sense
this is satisfying since we would like to believe that we would give great value
to prevent our extinction. However, we used the number of US$300 trillion
(￿ = 1=2) for the expected value and argued that it is what we should spend
to defend against extinction also does not seem to be intuitively correct for
many reasons, not the least of which is that we would have no resources left
to do anything else. The answer to this dilemma is to recognize that what
we are really interested in is utility loss from extinction rather than expected
value for the dollars we allocate. This view can help us achieve an intuitively
pleasing answer that we should spend as much money today on defenses against
extiction that can be usefully transferred into improved protection. In the case
of asteroids based on current estimates many experts believe this might be only
about 10 times what we are now spending which is about US$30 million dollars.
This is such a small number and the correct valuation of the risk is high enough
that we should need no further analysits to decide to increase our e⁄orts now
and when new opportunities become available in the future.
10 Conclusions
We believe that the above analysis is the beginning of a much more extensive
assesment and research about our response to all kinds of catastrophic risks.
Recent results provide ways to enhance our subjective judgements about the
value of ￿; which is approximated by the marginal utility of avoiding extinction
near the catastrophe, see Chichilnisky [5].
Other methods could include the application of Bayesian analysis involving
experts who can understand the nature of the threats as well as the correct
meaning of low probability. The Bayesian approach can be helpful to detemine
both the true risk pro￿le and the most plausible utility function for the use of
resources to combat a given threat. When such evaluations identify not only
high expected value but also high utility (there are very expensive things we
can do to prevent the risk) then the allocations of a large amount of resources
is warranted and the problem will become more complicated. Our political
leaders will need to make the more di¢ cult choices between meeting todays￿
needs compared with the need to defend against distant catastrophic threats.
This is not a new challenge since we and other countries spend a signi￿cant part
of our resources to defend against the threat of nuclear war or the nuclear winter
that would follow it. What is new is that now we recognize that many serious
threats like those arising from glaciation, asteroid impact, and biodiversity loss
are unlikely to occur within our lifetimes, yet we do not want to wake up one day
and ￿nd that we are facing the impact of what was an avoidable catastrophic
risk. Furthermore the same type of de￿ciency in our approach also exists for
14very rare events like tsunamis and earthquakes also leading to a poor allocation
of resources, as was likely the case for the 2005 Asian tsunami. This work
provides a framework to address these threats in a way that agrees with our
intuition. We would like to allocate resources in a way that can be useuful in
reducing the catastrophic threats we face.
In conclusion we o⁄er another perspective that might also be useful for
understanding why it is now that we are confronting the dilemma. An analogy
might help. In the early days nobody spent a lot of money on personal insurance
to protect themselves. As we gained more knowledge of the risks we face and as
we became a› uent enough we decided to spend increasing amounts of money on
insurance. In a similar way our species only recently has obtained the knowledge
of some of the catastrophic risks we face and developed a needed revision to cope
with them. For the moment we are seriously underinsured so any way that we
can do useful things to reduce our risk we should do so. Someday in the future
we may be challenged as we were doing the cold war to decide between the
present risks and future ones.
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